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SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE- PART I 
Paul C. Giannelli 
Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University 
Scientific evidence plays an important role in crim-
inal trials. The forensic chemist, the pathologist, the 
questioned document examiner, and the fingerprint 
expert are frequently encountered in criminal prac-
tice. Moreover, the use of scientific evidence in crimi-
nal prosecutions is expanding. In the past decade 
courts have faced the difficult task of ruling on the 
admissibility of evidence derived from a vast array of 
newly ascertained or applied scientific principles. The 
following list is but a sample: 
neutron activation analysis, State v. Holt, 17 Ohio St.2d 
81, 246 N.E.2d 365 (1969); U.S. v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431 
(6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 ( 1971). 
sound spectrometry (voiceprints), State v. 0 lderman, 44 
Ohio App.2d 130,336 N.E.2d 442 (1975); U.S. v. Addi-
son, 498 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
trace metal detection, State v. Daniels, 37 Ohio App.2d 
4, 305 N.E.2d 497 (1973); People v. Lauro, 91 Misc.2d 
706,398 N.Y.S.2d 503 (1977). 
ion microprobic analysis, U.S. v. Brown, 557 F .2d 541 
(6th Cir. 1977). 
psychological stress evaluation, State v. Smith, 31 Md. 
App. 106, 355 A.2d 527 (1976). 
scanning electron microscopic analysis, People v. Palmer, 
80 Cal. App.3d 239, 145 Cal. Rptr. 466 (1978). 
remote sensing evidence, U.S. v. Kilgus, 571 F.2d 508 
(9th Cir. 1978). 
bitemark comparisons, People v. Marx, 54 Cal. App.3d 
100, 126 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1975); People v. Milone, 43 
Ill. App.3d 385, 356 N.E.2d 1350 (1976). 
In addition, prior rulings on the admissibility of scien-
tific evidence have been challenged. In some cases, 
previously rejected evidence, such as polygraph exam-
inations, has gained admissibility. See State v. Souel, 
53 Ohio St.2d 123,372 N.E.2d 1318 (1978) (ad-
missible upon stipulation); U.S. v. Riding, 350 F. 
Supp. 90 (E.D. Mich. 1972). In other cases, some 
well-accepted scientific techniques have been rejected. 
See State v. Aquilera, 25 Crim. L. Rptr. 2189 (1979) 
(radar evidence); State v. Vail, 274 N.W.2d 127 
(Minn. 1979) (marihuana tests). 
Public Defender: Hyman Friedman 
Scientific evidence is especially difficult to use (and 
to rebut) because most attorneys lack the requisite 
backgrounds in science and technology. Perhaps more 
importantly, some "experts" also lack such back-
grounds. This article examines some of the major 
legal issues associated with the use of scientific evi-
dence. Part II, which will appear in the next issue of 
the Reporter, will focus on particular forensic tech-
niques, such as voiceprints, gunshot residue tests, 
polygraph examinations, and bitemark comparisons. 
FOUNDATIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
The reliability of evidence derived from a scientific 
principle or theory depends upon the following fac-
tors: (1) the validity of the underlying principle, (2) 
the validity of the technique applying that principle, 
and (3) the proper application of the technique on a 
particular occasion. 
Validity of the Principle and the Technique 
The first two factors- the validity of the underly-
ing principle and the validity of the technique apply-
ing that principle- are critical when considering the 
admissibility of evidence derived from a novel scien-
tific procedure. Both factors involve a question of 
relevancy. See Strong, Questions Affecting the Ad-
missibility of Scientific Evidence, 1970 U. Ill. L. F. 1, 
14. If, for example, everyone's voice is not unique, 
the results of voiceprint analysis would not tend to 
establish the identity of a speaker. Or, if fear of de-
tection does not produce certain physiological reac-
tions, the results of polygraph examinations would 
not tend to establish whether the subject of the 
examination was truthful or not. 
Although most courts do not distinguish between 
the validity of the underlying scientific principle and 
the technique's successful application of that princi-
ple, two distinct issues are present. A court, for exam-
ple, could accept the underlying premise of voiceprint 
identification (voice uniqueness) but not the voice-
print technique. Similarly, the underlying psychologi-
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cal and physiological principles of the polygraph 
could be acknowledged without endorsing the propo-
sition that an examiner can detect deception by means 
of the polygraph technique. 
The validity of the theory and the technique can 
be established in several ways. First, expert testimony 
concerning the validity of a particular technique could 
be introduced. Second, if a technique has been suf-
ficiently established, a court coul<;l take judicial notice 
of the technique's validity, thereby relieving the offer-
ing party of the burden of introducing expert testi-
mony on this issue. The principles underlying radar, 
intoxication tests, fingerprint comparison and fire-
arms identification have all been judicially recognized 
in this fashion. See C. McCormick, Evidence 763 (2d 
ed. 1972). See also City of East Clevelandv. Ferell, 
168 Ohio St. 298, 154 N.E.2d 630 (1958) (radar); 
State v. Shelt, 46 Ohio App.2d 115, 120, 346 N.E.2d 
345, 348-49 ( 1976) ( M R-7 radar device) (concurring 
opinions); City of Akron v. Gray, 60 Ohio Misc. 68 
(1979) (1<-55 radar device). Third, the validity of a 
scientific technique could be recognized legislatively. 
See R.C. 4511.19 (intoxication tests). Like judicial 
notice, such a statute relieves the proponent of scien-
tific evidence of the burden of introducing expert 
testimony on the validity issue. 
Typically, the validity of a novel technique must 
be established through expert testimony. See Tiffin 
v. Whitmer, 32 Ohio Misc. 169, 170, 290 N.E.2d 198, 
199 (1970) ("Because the instrument [VASCAR] is 
new, expert testimony as to the scientific principle, 
construction, operation, accuracy and reliability of 
the device must be established beyond a reasonable 
doubt."); State v. Shelt, 46 Ohio App.2d 115, 346 
N.E.2d 345 ( 1976); State v. Wilcox, 40 Ohio App.2d 
380, 319 N.E.2d 615 (1974). 
The General Acceptance Standard 
Fryev. U.S., 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), is the 
leading case on the admissibility of novel scientific 
evidence by means of expert testimony. In rejecting 
polygraph evidence, the D.C. Circuit set forth what 
has come to be known as the "general acceptance'' 
test. The court, in an oft-quoted passage, commented: 
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the 
line between the experimental and demonstrable stages 
is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone 
the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, 
and while the courts will go a long way in admitting ex-
pert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific 
principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduc· 
tion is made must be sufficiently established to have 
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which 
it belongs. /d. at 1014. 
The court went on to hold that the polygraph had 
"not yet gained such standing and scientific recogni-
tion among the physiological and psychological au-
thorities." /d. 
A number of commentators have criticized the 
general acceptance standard, e.g., C. McCormick, Evi-
dence 489-90 (2d ed. 1972), and several courts have 
rejected the standard. E.g., U.S. v. Baller, 519 F.2d 
463 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975); 
State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500 (Me. 1978). Other 
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courts, however, have adhered steadfastly to the Frye 
test. See U.S. v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 
1974); Peoplev.Kelly, 17 Cal.3d 24,130 Cal. Rptr. 
144,549 P.2d 1240 (1976); Reed v. State, 283 Md. 
374,391 A.2d 364 (1978); People v. Tobey, 401 
Mich. 141,257 N.W.2d 537 (1977); Commonwealth 
v. Tapa, 471 Pa. 223,369 A.2d 1277 (1977). 
The general acceptance test has been accepted by 
the Ohio courts of appeal. A number of polygraph 
cases have used the Frye test. See State v. Towns, 35 
Ohio App.2d 237,301 N.E.2d 700 (1973) ("lie detec-
tor test has not yet attained scientific acceptance."); 
State v. Hill, 40 Ohio App.2d 16, 317 N.E.2d 233 
(1963) (polygraph has not received "scientific recog-
nition"); State v. Smith, 113 Ohio App. 461, 463, 
178 N.E.2d 605 (1960) ("lie detector has not yet at-
tained scientific acceptance"); Parker v. Friendt, 99 
Ohio App. 329,338,118 N.E.2d 216 (1954) (poly-
graph inadmissible because of lack of "general scien-
tific recognition and public acceptance."). The test 
has also been employed in voiceprint and gunshot 
residue cases. See State v. Olderman, 44 Ohio App.2d 
130, 336 N.E.2d 442 (1975) (voiceprints); State v. 
Smith, 50 Ohio App.2d 183,362 N.E.2d 1239 (1976) 
(gunshot residue test). Nevertheless, the Supreme 
Court of Ohio has never explicitly adopted the Frye 
test. In upholding the admissibility of polygraph evi-
dence upon stipulation, the Court mentioned Frye 
but gave no indication that Frye was the controlling 
standard in Ohio. State v. Souel, 53 Ohio St.2d 123, 
130, 372 N.E.2d 1318, 1322 (1978). Indeed, the 
Court, in a footnote, quoted extensively from McCor-
mick's critical comments. /d. at 130 n.4, 372 N. E.2d 
at 1322 n.4. In a prior case, however, the Court 
seemed to come close to adopting the Frye standard. 
See State v. Holt, 17 Ohio St.2d 81, 85, 246 N.E.2d 
365, 367 ( 1969) ("Neutron Activation Analysis has 
not yet reached the point of generally proven reliabil-
ity .... "). ' 
Several arguments have been offered to support the 
general acceptance standard. First, that standard 
guarantees that "a minimal reserve of experts exists 
who can critically examine the validity of a scientific 
determination in a particular case." U.S. v. Addison, 
498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Second, the 
Frye test "may well promote a degree of uniformity 
of decision. Individual judges whose particular conclu-
sions may differ regarding the reliability of particular 
scientific evidence, may discover substantial agree-
ment and consensus in the scientific community." 
Peoplev.l<elly, 17 Cal.3d 24, 31,130 Cal. Rptr.144, 
148-49, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244-45 (1976). Finally, 
"[w]ithout the Frye test or something similar, there-
liability of an experimental scientific technique is 
likely to become a central issue in each trial in which 
it is introduced, as long as there remains serious dis-
agreement in the scientific community over its relia-
bility. Again and again, the examination and cross-
examination of expert witnesses will be ... protracted 
and time-consuming ... and the proceedings may 
well degenerate into trials of the technique itself." 




The principal justification for the Frye t~st, how-
ever is that it creates a procedure for ensunng the re-
liabi,lity of scientific evidence: "The requir~ment of 
general acceptance in the scientific commun1ty as-
sures that those most qualified to assess the general_ 
validity of a scientific method will have the determrn-
ative voice." U.S. v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743-44 
(D.C. Cir. 1974). Without some standard, sue~ a~ 
Frye, which requires a special b~rden ~o ~e. ~at1sf1~d 
before innovative techniques garn admiSSibility, evi-
dence derived from many techniques whose validity 
has not been established will be admitted. As a conse-
quence, the burden of rebutting such evidence will 
fall on the opposing party -_most often the defend-
ant. See State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500, 506 (Me. 
1978) (dissenting opinion) (the "burden of rebuttal is 
generally borne in the criminal cases by de!end_a~ts 
without the economic means to marshal sc1ent1f1c 
witnesses for a battle of the experts."). As the Sixth 
Circuit has commented: "A courtroom is not are- · 
search laboratory. The fate of a defendant in a crimi-
nal prosecution should not hang on his ability to suc-
cessfully rebut scientific evidence which bears an 
'aura of special reliability and trustworthiness,' al-
though, in reality the witness is t~stifying on t~e basis 
of an unproved hypothesis in an Isolated expenment 
which has yet to gain general acceptance in its field." 
U.S. v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541,556 (6th Cir. 1977). 
The Qualifications of Expert Witnesses 
No matter what standard of admissibility is adopt-
ed, only a person thoroughly acquainted with the_ ~n­
derlying theory and its application would be qual1f1ed 
to testify about the validity of a new scientific tech-
nique. This usually means a scientist must be called 
as the expert. Too often, a technician, rather than a 
scientist, has been permitted to testify. For example, 
in State v. Daniels, 37 Ohio App.2d 4, 305 N.E.2d 
497 (1973) the court upheld the admissibility of evi-
dence based upon the trace metal detection technique. 
The only person who testified about the technique 
was a police officer. Although the officer was quali-
fied to testify about the procedure used and the re-
sults obtained in that particular case, he was not quali-
fied to testify about the validity of the technique. 
Nevertheless, the officer's assertions about the validity 
of the test were accepted without further scrutiny. In 
contrast, the same technique was excluded in People 
v. Lauro, 91 Misc.2d 706, 398 N.Y.S.2d 503 (1977), 
because there was "absolutely no testimony before 
the Court as to this test having been received in any 
court or in the literature of forensic science; nor is 
there any scientific data presented to show the relia-
bility of this test." /d. at 712, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 507. 
A police officer also testified in Lauro. 
Another example of technician testimony is found 
in State v. Smith, 50 Ohio App.2d 183, 362 N.E.2d 
1239 (1967). In Smith a police officer testified that 
gunshot residues were detected on the hands of the 
defendant based upon the results of the Harrison-Gil-
roy test as modified by the officer. On appeal, the 
court reversed because there was "no evidence in the 
record from which it [could] be concluded that [the 
officer] was qualified either to testify as to the thea-
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retical basis of a new test for determining the presence 
of gunshot residue or to give expert testimony that 
such a test was generally accepted in the scientific 
community." /d. at 193, 362 N.E.2d at 1246. See 
also People v. Kelly, 17 Cal.3d 24, 39, 130 Cal. Rptr. 
144, 154,549 P.2d 1240, 1250 (1976) (voi.c~print ex-
pert's qualifications ~ere "those ?f a_te~~nrc1_an and 
law enforcement off1cer, not a sc1ent1st. ) ; K1rk, The 
fnterrelationshipofLawandScience, 13 Buff. L. Rev. 
393 394 (1964) ("[T]hetechnician merely follows 
pres'cribed routines, and is not expected to understand 
their underlying fundamentals. He knows how, but 
not why."). 
Proper Application of the Technique 
Once the validity of the principle and the technique 
have been established, either by expert testimony or 
by judicial notice, the proper_ ap~lication <;>f the tech-
nique on the particular occas1on 1~volved rn t~e ca_se 
must be demonstrated. This requ1res an examrnat1on 
into the condition of any instrumentation employed 
in the technique, adherence to proper procedures, the 
qualifications of the person conduct~ng the p:ocedure, 
and the qualifications of the person rnterpretrng the 
results. Generally, these conditions have been recog-
nized by the Ohio cases. See City of East CIE:lveland v. 
Ferell 168 Ohio St. 298,303, 154 N.E.2d 630, 
633 d 958) ("There remains ... a determination as to 
the sufficiency of the evidence concerning the accura-
cy of the particular speed meter involved in the i~­
stant case and the qualifications of the person usrng 
it."); City of Columbus v. Marks, 118 Ohio App. 359, 
361 194 N.E.2d 791,793 (1963) ("The particularap-
par;tus used must be reliable" and the "test must 
have been conducted and the apparatus used in a com-
petent manner by a qualified person."); Tiffin v. 
Whitmer, 32 Ohio Misc. 169, 171,290 N.E.2d 198, 
200 (1970) ("The City is required to prove proper 
testing and use of the device [VASCAR]"); City of 
Akron v. Gray, 60 Ohio Misc. 68,69 (1979) (The 
"court must consider: (1) Whether the unit was in 
good operating condition at the time o~ the instant 
use; (2) whether the operator of the un1t was properly 
qualified; and (3) whether the ope:ator l?roperly _read 
the unit."). See generally, E. lmwrnkelned, P. Gian-
nelli, F. Gilligan, & F. Lederer, Criminal Evidence, 
ch. 8 (1979). 
For cases discussing the proper procedures for 
breathalyzer analysis, see State v. Walker, 53 Ohio 
St.2d 192,374 N.E.2d 132 (1978); State v. Steele, 52 
Ohio St.2d 187,370 N.E.2d 740 (1977). 
THE RIGHT TO A DEFENSE EXPERT 
In a case involving scientific evidence, the defense 
counsel's most important, and perhaps most difficult, 
task will be obtaining the services of a defense expert. 
See U.S. v. Bailer, 519 F .2d 463, 466 (4th Cir.) cert. 
denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975) ("[l]t is difficult tore-
but [expert] opinion except by other experts or by 
cross-examination based on a thorough acquaintance 
with the underlying principles"). Several develop-
ments have facilitated the task of securing expert as-
sistance. A growing number of courts have recognized 
that indigent defendants are constitutionally entitled 
to expert assistance at state expense. A number of 
constitutional grounds for such assistance have been 
recognized. In People v. Watson, 36 111.2d 228, 221 
N.E.2d 645 (1966), the court held that the compulso-
ry process clause required the state to provide funds 
for a questioned document examiner to assist the de-
fense: 
The court recognizes that there is a distinction be-
tween the right to call witnesses and the right to have 
these witnesses paid for by the government, but in cer-
tain instances involving indigents, the lack of funds with 
which to pay for the witness will often preclude him 
from calling that witness and occasionally prevent him 
from offering a defense. Thus, although the defendant is 
afforded the shadow of the right to call witnesses, he is 
deprived of the substance. 1d. at 233, 221 N.E.2d at 
648. 
Other courts have found a right to the assistance of 
experts in the defendant's guarantee of effective assis-
tance of counsel. For example, in Bush v. McCollum, 
231 F. Supp. 560 (D.C. Tex. 1964), aff'd, 344 F.2d 
672 (5th Cir. 1965), the court commented: "But the 
right to counsel is meaningless if the lawyer is unable 
to make an effective defense because he has no funds 
to provide the specialized testimony that the case re-
quires .... In order for[the defendant} in the in-
stant case to have the effective aid of counsel, it was 
necessary for his counsel to have the assistance of a 
qualified psychiatrist .... " /d. at 565. See also 
Hintz v. Beta, 379 F.2d 937, 941 (5th Cir. 1967); 
ABA Standards Relating to Providing Defense Serv-
ices 23 (1967) ("The quality of representation at trial 
may be excellent and yet valueless to the defendant if 
his defense requires ... [the} services of a handwrit-
ing expert and no such services are available."). 
Still other courts have looked to the equal protec-
tion clause. In Jacobs v. U.S., 350 F .2d 571 (4th Cir. 
1965), the court observed: "It is obvious that only 
[the defendant's} inability to pay for the services of a 
psychiatrist prevented a proper presentation of his 
case. The Supreme Court has unmistakably held that 
in criminal proceedings it will not tolerate discrimina-
tion between indigents and those who possess the 
means to protect their rights." /d. at 573. Cf. Doug-
las v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illi-
nois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). Finally, some courts have 
reached the same result on due process grounds. See 
Robinson v. Pate, 345 F .2d 691, 695 (7th Cir. 1965), 
aff'd in part, remanded in part on other grounds, 383 
U.S. 375 (1966) ("[T}he denial of a reasonable re-
quest to obtain the services of a necessary psychiatric 
witness is effectually a suppression of evidence violat-
ing the fundamental right of due process."). 
See generally, Anno., 34 A. L. R.3d 1256 ( 1970); 
Note, The Indigent's Right to an Adequate Defense: 
Expert and Investigational Assistance in Criminal Pro-
ceedings, 55 Cornell L.J. 632 (1970); Note, Right to 
Aid in Addition to Counsel for Indigent Criminal De-
fendants, 48 Minn. L. Rev. 1054 (1963); Note, Crim-
inal Law: Indigent Defendant's Right to Independent 
Psychiatrist, 7 Tu I sa L.J. 137 ( 1971). 
In many jurisdictions, the right to defense experts 
is governed by statute. For example, the Criminal 
Justice Act of 1964 provides for such assistance in 
federal cases. 18 U.S.C. §3006(A)(e) (1976). See 
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generally, Anno., 6 A.L.R. Fed. 1007 (1971); 3 C. 
Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure 740 (1969); 
Note, The Criminal justice Act of 7964- The De-
fendant's Right to an Independent Psychiatric Exami-
nation, 28Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 443 (1971). In Ohio, 
R.C. 120.04(C) provides that the "state public de-
fender may: (1) In providing legal representation, 
conduct investigations, obtain expert testimony ... 
which are appropriate and necessary to an adequate 
defense .... " R.C.120.15(C) recognizes the same 
authority for county public defenders. 
DISCOVERY 
Scientific Reports 
Criminal Rule 16(B)(1)(d) provides for discovery 
by the defense of "any results or reports ... of scien-
tific tests or experiments .... " This type of discovery 
provision is intended to cover "autopsy reports, re-
ports of medical examinations of victims, of any psy-
chiatric examination of accused, of chemical analyses, 
of blood tests, of handwriting and fingerprint com-
parisons, of ballistics tests and the like." ABA Stan-
dards Relating to Discovery and Procedure Before 
Trial 67 ( 1970). The principal defect in this provision 
is that it does not explicitly require disclosure of the 
testing methods used by the government's expert. 
Without knowledge of the testing methods, the de-
fense cannot adequately prepare to challenge the test 
results. 
Several Ohio cases have addressed this problem. In 
State v. Cross, 48 Ohio App.2d 357,357 N.E.2d 1103 
(1975), the court stated: 
We do not agree with defendant's contention that the 
court's ruling with regard to the discovery of the chem-
ist's testing methods was erroneous. Defendant, through 
his letter requesting discovery, under Crim. R. 16, was 
furnished all the [.eports from the chemist, ... which 
were within the possession or control of the prosecutor. 
The defendant knew the chemist's name and had ample 
time to interview him for trial purposes by deposition, or 
otherwise, to ascertain the testing methods. /d. at 360, 
357 N.E.2d at 1105-06. 
This passage implies that procedures for discovering 
the testing methods were available but that the de-
fendant failed to use them. The reference to the 
availability of a deposition procedure, however, is 
puzzling because Criminal Rule 15 limits the use of 
criminal depositions to the preservation of testi-
mony; it is not a discovery procedure. Neverthe-
less, the use of Criminal Rule 15 as a discovery device 
has also been sanctioned by the Ohio Supreme Court. 
In State v. Walker, 53 Ohio St.2d 192, 374 N.E.2d 
132 (1978), the Court stated: "In Ohio, it is not 
questioned that through pretrial discovery under 
Crim. R. 16 the defense may obtain the name of the 
individual responsible for conducting the calibration 
[breathalyzer 1 test, and determine through deposi-
tion under Crim. R. 15 whether such individual util-
ized the proper methods in calibrating the machine." 
/d. at 197, 374 N.E.2d at 135. 
One other point deserves comment. Criminal Rule 
16(D) imposes on the prosecution a continuing duty 
to disclose. In U.S. v. Kelly, 420 F .2d 26 ( 2d Cir. 
1969), the defendant moved for the production of all 
scientific tests. The government agreed to provide re-
ports of drug analysis. Subsequently, the government 
had the drugs tested by neutron activation analysis, 
but failed to inform the defense of the new tests. The 
Second Circuit reversed, finding a violation of the 
government's continuing duty to disclose. The court 
concluded that "fairness requires that adequate notice 
be given the defense to check the findings and conclu-
sions of the government's experts" and that the 
"course of the government smacks too much of a 
trial by ambush .... " /d. at 29. 
Disclosure of Favorable Evidence 
Criminal Rule 16(B)(1 )(f) requires the prosecution 
to disclose evidence favorable to the defendant upon 
request. This provision follows the constitutional re-
quirements of Brady v.. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
The leading Ohio case on this issue, McMullen v. Max-
well, 3 Ohio St.2d 160, 209 N.E.2d 449 (1965), in-
volved the state's failure to disclose a ballistics report 
showing that the defendant's gun had not fired the 
fatal bullet. According to the Court, "[s] ince the ex-
cluded evidence ... was of such a substantial nature, 
the failure of the prosecutor to disclose it deprived 
petitioner of his right to a fair trial." /d. at 168, 209 
N.E.2d at 456. Other cases applying the Brady doc-
trine to scientific evidence include: State v. Sahlie, 
245 N.W.2d 476 (S.D. 1976) (failure to disclose exis-
tence of unidentified fingerprints); People v. Drake, 
64 Mich. App. 671,236 N.W.2d 537 (1975) (failure 
to disclose results of blood and urine analysis of mur· 
~ der victim); State v. Gammill, 585 P.2d 1074 (l<an. I App. 1978) (failure to disclose results of examinations 
of rape victim). 
Retesting 
In order to challenge scientific evidence, a defend-
ant in many cases must have an opportunity to have 
the evidence reexamined by its own expert. Criminal 
Rule 16( B)( 1 )(c) provides for the inspection of tangi-
ble objects within the possession or control of the 
state, and thus would appear to provide for retesting 
by the defense. Moreover, a number of courts have 
found that such a right is constitutionally guaranteed. 
For example, in Barnard v. Henderson, 514 F .2d 744 
(5th Cir. 1975), the defendant's request for inspec-
tion of a murder weapon and bullet was rejected by 
the state courts. The Fifth Circuit, however, granted 
the defendant habeas relief, holding: " [ F] undamental 
fairness is violated when a criminal defendant ... is 
denied the opportunity to have an expert of his 
choosing, bound by appropriate safeguards imposed 
by the Court, examine a piece of critical evidence 
whose nature is subject to varying expert opinion." 
ld. at 746. See also White v. Maggio, 556 F .2d 1352 
(5th Cir. 1977); Warren v. State, 292 Ala. 71,288 
So.2d 826 ( 1973); Patterson v. State, 238 Ga. 204, 
232 S.E.2d 233 ( 1977); Jackson v. State, 243 So.2d 
396 ( 1970): Other courts have reached the same re-
sult on nonconstitutional grounds. See James v. Com-
rryonwealth, 482 S.W.2d 92 (Ky. 1972); State v. Gad-
dis, 530 S.W.2d 64 (Tenn. 1975); People v. White, 40 
N.Y.2d 797,358 N.E.2d 1031 (1976). 
The opportunity to reexamine evidence is especial-
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ly critical when novel scientific techniques are intro-
duced. The Sixth Circuit, in a case involving neutron 
activation analysis, commented: " [I] f the government 
sees fit to use this time consuming, expensive means 
of fact-finding, it must both allow time for a defend-
ant to make similar tests, and in the instance of an in-
digent defendant, a means to provide for payment for 
same." U.S. v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 441 (6th Cir. 
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971 ). 
The Duty to Preserve Evidence 
Once it is established that a defendant has the right 
to reexamine scientific evidence, it follows that the 
state would have a corollary duty to preserve such 
evidence. Otherwise, the right to reexamination 
would be meaningless. The leading case on this issue 
is Peoplev. Hitch, 11 Cal.3d 159,113 Cal. Rptr.158, 
520 P.2d 974, vacated, 12 Cal.3d 641, 117 Cal. Rptr. 
9, 527 P.2d 361 (1974). Hitch involved the preserva-
tion of ampoules used in a breathalyzer test. Accord-
ing to the court, failure to adopt procedures for the 
preservation of the ampoules deprived the defendant 
of due process. See People v. Municipal Court (Ahne-
mann),12 Ca1.3d 658, 663, 117 Cal. 8ptr. 20, 22-23, 
527 P.2d 372,374-75 (1974) ("[D]ue process requires 
such evidence to be disclosed by the prosecution ... 
[and] since the prosecution has the duty to disclose 
such material evidence, the investigative agency in-
volved in the test has the duty to preserve it for dis-
closure .... "). See also Garcia v. District Court, 589 
P.2d 924 (Colo. 1979); State v. Michener, 25 Or. App. 
523,550 P.2d 449 (1976). 
The Ohio courts have yet to adopt the Hitch ration-
ale. See State v. Watson, 48 Ohio App.2d 110, 355 
N.E.2d 883 (1975); State v. Grose, 45 Ohio Misc. 1, 
340 N.E.2d 441 (1975). See generally, State v. Grose: 
The Right of the Accused to the Breathalyzer Test 
Ampoule, 3 Ohio North. U. L. Rev. 1339 (1976). 
Nevertheless, the issue is far from settled. The hold-
ing in Watson was limited; the court stated: 
Therefore, we hold that while the test ampoule and its 
solution used in the breathalyzer test given to the de-
fendant may be "material to the preparation of his de-
fense" (within the meaning of.Crim. R. 16(B)(1)(c)) and 
ordinarily excludable from evidence when made unavail-
able to him, where there is no evidence that the ampoule 
and solution, if preserved, could be scientifically exam-
ined so as to produce conclusive results, nor that it was 
maliciously destroyed, the results of the breathalyzer 
test may be admitted. /d. at 112, 355 N.E.2d at 885. 
This passage suggests that had evidence demonstrating 
the value of retesting been offered, the court would 
have decided the case differently. No such evidence 
was presented in Watson. /d. 
More importantly, the duty to preserve evidence 
has been extended beyond the breathalyzer context. 
In People v. Taylor, 54 Ill. App.3d 454, 369 N.E.2d 
573 (1977), heroin allegedly sold by the defendant 
was consumed in an unnecessary laboratory test. The 
court reversed the defendant's conviction: "We hold 
... that defendant in the instant case was denied due 
process of law and the opportunity for meaningful 
confrontation of the witnesses against him by the 
State's unnecessary destruction of the allegedly pro-
hibited substance .... " /d. at 457, 369 N.E.2d at 
576. See also State v. Hannah, 120 Ariz. 1, 583 P.2d 
888 (1978) (destruction of evidence of arson); People 
v. Gomez, 596 P.2d 1192 (Colo. 1 979) (destruction 
of heroin); Jackson v. State, 249 So.2d 470 (Fla. App. 
1971 ), aff'd, 280 So.2d 673 (1973) (destruction of a 
bullet); State v. Wright, 87 Wash.2d 783, 557 P.2d 1 
(1976) (destruction of evidence in homicide case). 
See generally, Note, The Right to Independent Test-
ing: A New Hitch in the Preservation of Evidence 
Doctrine,.75Colum. L. Rev.1355 (1975);Preserva-
tion of Due Process When Evidence is Destroyed or 
Tested, 53 Wash. L. Rev. 573 (1978); Comment, 
judicial Response to Government Loss or Destruction 
of Evidence, 39 U. Chi. L. Rev. 542 (1972); Govern-
ment Has Duty to Implement Effective Guidelines to 
Preserve Discoverable Evidence, 1971 Duke L.J. 644. 
Prosecutorial Discovery 
Criminal Rule 16 provides for reciprocal discovery 
by the prosecution if the defense requests production 
of tangible objects or the results of scientific tests. 
Crim. R. 16(C)(1 )(a) & (b). These provisions, how-
ever, are more restrictive than the comparable provi-
sions for defense discovery. For example, the defense 
is entitled to all scientific reports "made in connec-
tion with the particular case," while the prosecution 
is entitled to scientific reports only if "made in con-
nection with the particular case" and the defendant 
intends to introduce the evidence at trial or intends 
to call a witness "when such results or reports relate 
to his testimony." 
Thus, if the defendant does not intend to use the 
scientific evidence at trial, discovery is not required. 
Nevertheless, the prosecution may learn of the exis-
tence of a defense expert and attempt to call that ex-
pert as a prosecution witness. Such a tactic runs 
afoul of the defendant's right to effective assistance 
of counsel as well as the attorney-client privilege. In 
Statev. Mingo, 77 N.J. 576,392 A.2d 590 (1978), 
the defense retained a questioned document examiner 
to compare handwriting exemplars provided by the 
defendant with a writing used in the commission of a 
crime. The examiner concluded that the exemplars 
were written by the same person. Consequently, the 
defense decided not to call the expert. The prosecu-
tion, however, subpoenaed the expert and he testified 
as a government witness. The New Jersey Supreme 
Court reversed, resting its decision on the right to ef-
fective representation of counsel and the attorney-
client privilege. The Third Circuit reached the same 
result in U.S. v_ Alvarez, 519 F .2d 1036 (3d Cir. 
1 975). According to that court, the "attorney must 
be free to make an informed judgment with respect to 
the best course for the defense without the inhibition 
of creating a potential government witness." !d. at 
1047. See also Edney v. Smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038 
(E.D.N.Y. 1976); Pouncey v. State, 353 So.2d 640 
(Fla. App. 1 977). See generally, R.C. 2317 .02(A) 
(attorney-client privilege); C. McCormick, Evidence 
188-89 (2d ed. 1 972); 2 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, 
Weinstein's Evidence 503-26 (1975). 
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THE RIGHT TO PRESENT DEFENSE EVIDENCE 
A criminal defendant's right to present defense evi-
dence has been recognized in several U.S. Supreme 
Court decisions. Such a right can be inferred from 
the compulsory process guarantee. In Washington v. 
Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967), after holding that the 
compulsory process clause was binding upon the 
states, the Court stated: "The right to offer the testi-
mony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if 
necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a de-
fense .... " /d. at 19. The right to present defense 
evidence also finds support in the due process guaran-
tee. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 ( 1 973) 
(due process violated by state evidentiary rules which 
precluded the defendant from introducing critical and 
reliable defense evidence); Green v. Georgia, 99 S.Ct. 
2150 (1 979). See generally, Westen, The Compulsory 
Process Clause, 73 Mich. L. Rev. 73, 149-59 (1974); 
Clinton, The Right to Present a Defense: An Emer-
gent Constitutional Guarantee in Criminal Trials, 9 
Ind. L. Rev. 711 (1976); Note, Constitutional Re-
straints on the Exclusion of Evidence in the Defend-
ant's Favor: The Implications of Davis v. Alaska, 73 
Mich. L. Rev.1465(1975). 
The right to present defense evidence has pl·ayed a 
significant part in several cases involving the use of 
scientific evidence. In State v. Sims, 52 Ohio Misc. 
31,369 N.E.2d 24 (1977), the court found an implied 
right to present defense evidence in the compulsory 
process clause and concluded that that right com-
pelled admission of defense polygraph evidence. In 
State v. Dorsey, 87 N.M. 323, 532 P.2d 912, aff'd, 88 
N.M. 184,539 P.2d 204 (1975), the court upheld the 
admissibility of defense-offered polygraph evidence on 
due process grounds. The court based its decision on 
Chambers v. Mississippi. See generally, Clinton, The 
Right to Present a Defense: An Emergent Constitu-
tional Guarantee in'Criminal Trials, 9 Ind. L. Rev. 
711, 810-15 ( 1 976); O'Connor, ''That's the Man"; A 
Sobering Study of Eyewitness Identification and the 
Polygraph, 49 St. John's L. Rev. 1, 27 (1 974). 
LABORATORY REPORTS 
The admissibility of laboratory reports has been 
litigated in a number of cases. The leading Ohio case 
is State v. Tims, 9 Ohio St.2d 136, 224 N.E.2d 348 
( 1 967), in which the prosecution introduced a hospi-
tal report of the examination of a rape victim. Ac-
cording to the prosecution, the report was admissible 
under the Business Record statute. R.C. 2317.40. 
The Ohio Supreme Court reversed on confrontation 
grounds: "This right of confrontation includes the 
right of cross-examination of the person who is the 
actual witness against him. If applicable in a criminal 
case, the Business Records as Evidence Act denies hin 
such right." !d. at 138, 224 N.E.2d at 351. Accord, 
State v. Miller, 42 Ohio St.2d 102, 326 N.E.2d 259 
(1 975). In a later case, the Court li[llited Tims: "The 
Tims case only involved the admissibility of hospital 
records; it clearly did not set forth a general rule pro-
scribing the introduction in evidence of all document 
that may qualify as a business record." State v. Walk 
er, 53 Ohio St.2d 192, 198, 374 N.E.2d 132, 136 
(1978). See also Stare v. I<ehn, 50 Ohio St.2d 11, 
361 N.E.2d 1330 (1977); State v. Colvin, 19 Ohio 
St.2d 86, 249 N.E.2d 784 (1969). The Court, how-
ever, has not overruled Tims. See generally, lmwin-
kelried, The Constitutionality of Introducing Evalua-
tive Laboratory Reports Against Criminal Defendants, 
30 Hastings L.J. 621 (1979). 
One other statutory provision is pertinent. R. C. 
2925.51 provides that a laboratory report is prima 
facie evidence in drug cases if the prosecutor serves a 
copy of the report on the defense. Subsection (C) 
provides that the "report shall not be prima facie evi-
dence ... if the accused or his attorney demands the 
testimony of the person signing the report .... " In 
State v. Reese, 56 Ohio App,2d 278, 382 N.E.2d 
1193 ( 1978), the prosecutor failed to serve a copy of 
the laboratory report on the defense. The court held 
that the statutory language was "mandatory" and 
consequently, the "failure on the part of the prose-
cutor to properly provide a copy to defense counsel 
renders such a report inadmissible." /d. at 281,382 
N.E.2d at 1195. 
RELATED ISSUES 
The scope of this article does not permit considera-
tion of all the issues presented by the use of scientific 
evidence. Nevertheless, several issues are important 
enough to note briefly. First, evidence submitted to a 
crime laboratory for analysis often is obtained from 
the defendant. This, of course, may raise constitu-
tional issues- principally the legality of a search or 
seizure. See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969) 
(probable cause lacking for seizure of suspect for fin-
gerprinting); 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure 321 & 
338 ( 1979). Second, once the state has obtained evi-
dence, from the defendant or from the crime scene, 
the prosecution will be required to identify the evi-
dence at trial. This will often require establishing a 
chain-of-custody. See State v. Reese, 56 Ohio App.2d 
278,382 N.E.2d 1193 (1978) ("The trial record here 
utterly fai Is to establish a continuous chain of custody 
[for drugs]."). 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
Search & Seizure 
Police, acting pursuant to a search warrant author-
izing the search of a bar and one bartender for nar-
cotics and associated paraphenafia, performed "curso-
ry weapons searches" of the occupants of the bar. 
During the frisks the officers found packets of narco-
tics on one of the patrons. The U.S. Supreme Court 
held that the search which produced the narcotics 
violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
Noting that the warrant mentioned only the bar and 
one bartender, the Court reasoned that the police had 
no probable cause to believe that any patron would 
be violating the law. In addition, the initial pat-down 
could not be justified under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 
(1968), since the frisk was not supported by a reason-
able belief that the patron was armed. The Court em-
... · Phasized that a valid Terry frisk requires a "reasonable 
. belief or suspicion directed at the person to be 
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frisked," and does not permit a "generalized 'cursory 
search for weapons'" among the occupants of the 
premises to be searched. Ybarra v. 11/inois, 1 00 S. Ct. 
338 (1979). 
Confrontation - Videotape Deposition 
The Sixth Circuit found error in the admission at 
trial of a videotape deposition taken while the de-
fendant was in another room watching the proceed-
ings on a monitor. On advice of psychiatrists, the vic-
tim of the crime gave her deposition "not within the 
vision" of the defendant. The defendant had a buzzer 
with which he could stop the questioning in order to 
confer with his counsel, but the witness was unaware 
of his presence. In reversing his conviction, the Court 
ruled that "the accuracy of [the witness'] perception 
of the events during the kidnapping and her recollec-
tion and expression of those events was crucial to the 
government's case. The partial confrontation allowed 
was inadequate to test those features of her testi-
mony." U.S. v. Benfield, 25 Crim. L. Rptr. 2026 
(6th Cir. 1979). 
Defense Witnesses 
According to the First Circuit, evidence of a wit-
ness' difficulty in identifying the defendant from a 
photographic array is probative and critical evidence, 
even when the witness does not testify for the prose-
cution. The Court held that the exclusion of the wit-
ness when called by the defendant was a denial of the 
Sixth Amendment right to present witnesses in one's 
own behalf. Pettijohn v. Hall, 599 F.2d 476 (1st Cir. 
1979). 
Stop and Frisk 
While stopped for a traffic offense, the defendant 
made several suspicious attempts to reach something 
inside his coat pocket. Consequently, the officer 
reached into the defendant's coat pocket and with-
drew an envelope containing stolen checks. The 
Ninth Circuit held that once the police officer re-
moved the envelope, he "had no concern that it might 
contain a weapon." Therefore the "examination of 
its contents was not 'an intrusion reasonably designed 
to discover instruments of assault' as required by 
Terry." Although reasonable at its inception, the 
frisk became unreasonable because of its scope. U.S. 
v. Thompson, 597 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1979). 
Security Guard Search 
The California Supreme Court held that the search 
and seizure provisions of the State Constitution are 
triggered when a private security guard conducts an 
investigation which goes beyond the purely private 
concerns of his employer and furthers a state interest. 
The Court found such a case to exist where store se-
curity guards searched, seized and detained a shop-
lifting suspect while waiting for police to arrive. Ac-
cording to the Court, "when private security person-
nel conduct an illegal search or seizure while engaged 
in a statutorily-authorized citizens arrest and deten-
tion of a person in aid of law enforcement authorities, 
the constitutional proscriptions ... are applicable." 
People v. Zelinski, 25 Crim. L. Rptr. 1042 (Cal. Sup. 
Ct. 1 979). . 
Accomplice Testimony 
At defendant's trial for assault, his alleged accom-
plice testified for the prosecution. When questioned 
by the defense regarding a promise of leniency in ex-
change for his testimony, the accomplice claimed the 
attorney-client privilege. On appeal, the Court held 
that a promise of leniency could not be protected by 
privilege. Noting that such information is "vital to 
the jury for a proper evaluation of ... credibility," 
the Court held that public policy_ "demands full dis-
closure to the jury of the term~ of such a bargain." 
Mays v. State, 25 Crim. L. Rptr. 2106 (Okla. Ct. 
Crim. App. 1979). 
Inventory Search 
When the defendant was found unconscious by po-
lice in his stopped automobile, he was taken to the 
hospital and the car was towed off the road where it 
had been blocking traffic. During the course of a war-
rantless inventory search of the auto, police opened a 
knapsack which was found to contain large amounts 
of illegal drugs. Since the knapsack could have easily 
been inventoried and stored as a unit, the Court held 
that the search and inventory of the contents of the 
knapsack were unwarranted in the absence of any 
dan!:le_r posed to the police. Concluding that no such 
ganger existed under the circumstances of the case, 
the Court ruled the evidence produced by the search 
was inadmissible. U.S. v. Bloomfield, 24 Crim. L. 
Rptr. 2530 (8th Cir. 1979). . 
Public Trial Right 
The Court held that the blanket exclusion of spec-
tators at an incest trial violated the defendant's Sixth 
Amendment right to a public trial. While the Court 
acknowledged that such an exclusion may be accept-
able during the testimony of children who are re-
quired to testify to sordid facts, the order in this case 
applied for the duration of the entire trial. The Court 
also ruled that the defendant did not waive his right 
to a public trial by failing to renew his objection at 
the end of the child's testimony. Cumbee v. Com-
monwealth, 25 Crim. L. Rptr. 2136 (1979). 
Judicial Impartiality 
The Court found plain error in the conduct of a 
fe_deral trial Jud~e in ~n otherwise "routine" one-day 
tnal. _The t:1al _Judge mterrupted the proceedings over 
250 t1mes, mfnnged upon the cross examination by 
defense counsel, interrupted defense counsel in the 
first sentence of the opening statement and made ex-
pressions of "contemptuous disbelief" ~t the testi-
mony of defense witnesses. According to the Court 
"given what occurred, the judge's jury instructions ' 
could not offset the effects of his conduct." U.S. v. 
Hickman, 24 Crim. L. Rptr. 2505 (6th Cir. 1979). 
Brady Doctrine 
During the defendants' trial, the prosecution was 
requested by the defense to produce any correspond-
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ence it had with the state parole board concerning its 
key witnesses. The prosecutor refused to produce 
any material and would not affirm or deny its exist-
ence. After trial, a letter from the prosecutor to the 
parole board asking that the witness' "cooperation" 
be taken into account at his parole hearing was re-
leased. Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), 
the prosecution must produce, upon request by the 
defense, information of an exculpatory nature in its 
possession. The Court held that " [ t] he nondisclosure 
of this evidence denied defendant his right to a fair 
trial," since the jury could have found that the evi-
d~nce indicated an ulterior motive on the part of the 
Witness. People v. Cwikla, 24 Crim. L. Rptr. 2485 
(N.Y. Ct. App. 1 979). 
Eyewitness Identification Instruction 
The Eighth Circuit has ruled that under certain cir-
cumstances a jury instruction on the possible unrelia-
bility of eyewitness identifications should be given 
See also U.S. v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 
1972). Where "the eyewitness identification is the 
sole basis for the conviction [and] there is the possi-
bility of misidentification," the trial court should give 
an instruction alerting the jury to the crucial role the 
eyewitness identification plays in the case. U.S. v. 
Greene, 24 Crim. L. Rptr. 2436 (8th Cir. 1 979). 
Traffic Stops- Ordering Passengers Out of Cars 
The Louisiana Supreme Court has refused to ex-
tend the holding of Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 
106 (1977) to automobile passengers. In Mimms, the 
Supreme Court ruled that police may routinely, and 
without probable cause, order drivers stopped for traf-
fic offenses out of their cars. The Mimms decision 
was based upon concern for the safetV of police offi-
cers enforcing traffic regulations. However, the Court 
found that protection of the police from injuries 
caused by passing traffic is not applicable when a pas-
senger is involved. In addition, an automobile passen-
ger has a greater expectation of privacy than the driv-
er. "To give the police officer the discretion to order 
the passenger from the automobile without requiring 
any explanation of the officer's actions (other than a 
blanket concern for personal safety in all situations) is 
to abandon the requirement ofindividualized inquiry 
into the reasons for an intrusion of the right to priva-
cy secured by Article 1, § 5 of the Louisiana Constitu-
tion." State v. Williams, 24 Crim. L. Rep. 2359 (La. 
Sup. Ct. 1979). 
